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I. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
Exceptions . . . all rules seem to have them. The National Labor Rela-
tions Act' calls its exceptions "provisos." For the construction industry, the
exceptions are the rules. Take, for example, sections 8(e)2 and 8(f)3 of the
NLRA, which govern the construction industry. Added to the NLRA as a
part of the Landrum-Griffin amendments of 1959,1 each is designed to address
the unique attributes of labor relations in an industry about which only one
thing is a constant - flux.6 The many faces of the construction industry make
generalization difficult. Its sectors' span from building single family dwellings
to roads, bridges and airports.7 Within any given sector (for instance, residen-
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982) [herinafter the NLRA or the Act].
2. 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1982).
3. 29 U.S.C. § 158(f) (1982).
4. Pub. L. No. 86-257, §§ 704(b), 705(a), 73 Stat. 519, 543, 545 (1959) (codi-
fied at 29 U.S.C. §§ 158-531 (1982)). The Landrum-Griffin amendments of 1959 are
officially titled the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act. Some sections of
Landrum-Griffin amended the NLRA. Sections 8(e) and 8(f) are two such sections.
Landrum-Griffin § 704(b) became NLRA § 8(e); Landrum-Griffin § 705(a) became
NLRA § 8(f).
5. See H. NORTHRUP, R. WILLIAMS & D. McDOWELL, DOUBLEBREASTED OPER-
ATIONS AND PRE-HIRE AGREEMENTS IN CONSTRUCTION: THE FACTS AND THE LAW 2
(1987) [hereinafter H. NORTHRUP]. "[C]onstruction is an industry not only of tremen-
dous size, but also of prodigious variety, so that generalizations about the industry are
difficult to make and often inaccurate when made." Id. See also John Deklewa & Sons,
282 N.L.R.B. No. 184, 124 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1185, 1190 (Feb. 20, 1987); Construc-
tion Industry Labor Legislation, 1985: Hearings on H.R. 281 Before the Subcomm. on
Labor-Management Relations of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. 6-21 (1985) (statement of Robert A. Georgine, President, Building
and Construction Trades Department, AFL-CIO).
6. Within each of these sectors, contractors operate both publicly and privately.
H. NORTHRUP, supra note 5, at 2.
7. Id.
The building of single family homes, apartments, and other dwellings
makes up the residential construction sector which may account for as much
1
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tial construction) there is a great deal of job specialization., These sectors,
however, are characterized by both seasonal and cyclical fluctuation. 9 Because
of the industry's unique character, sections 8(e) and 8(f) were adopted. 10
These sections help accomplish for the construction industry the same goals
the NLRA seeks to further in all instances of labor-management relations it
governs - employee free choice and labor relations stability.11
Section 8(e) of the Act prohibits "hot cargo" agreements. 12 A union and
employer may not enter into an agreement that prevents the employer from
"dealing in any of the products of any other employer,"' 3 or "doing business
with any other person." 4 The first proviso to section 8(e), with certain limita-
tions, exempts the construction industry from this prohibition.' 5 This allows
general construction contractors and unions to enter into collective bargaining
agreements which require subcontractors of the general contractor to sign the
agreement.' 6 This requirement gives rise to several questions:'1 1) in what con-
as 40 percent of all construction dollar volume in a single year. Commercial
construction includes such projects as stores, office buildings, warehouses,
small factories, hospitals, nursing homes, and service stations. Industrial con-
struction refers primarily to large factories, power plants, refineries, and other
large structures built for establishments engaged in secondary economic activ-
ity. Heavy and highway construction includes streets, roads, bridges, dams,
pipelines, airports, and subways. Government data do differentiate between
private and public construction, but public projects may be in any of the
aforementioned classes: residential construction (low-income housing), com-
mercial construction (schools, office buildings), industrial construction (power
plants), and heavy and highway construction (roads and bridges).
Id. at 1-2 (emphasis in original).
8. Id. at 1.
9. See, e.g., Jim McNeff, Inc. v. Todd, 461 U.S. 260, 266 (1983).
10. Id.
11. See, e.g., H. NORTHRUP, supra note 5, at 81; John Deklewa & Sons, 282
N.L.R.B. No. 184, 124 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1185, 1192 (Feb. 20, 1987).
12. 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1982) provides in pertinent part:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for any labor organization and any em-
ployer to enter into any contract or agreement, express or implied, whereby
such employer ceases or refrains or agrees to cease or refrain from handling,
using, selling, transporting or otherwise dealing in any of the products of any
other employer, or to cease doing business with any other person, and any
contract or agreement entered into heretofore or hereafter containing such an
agreement shall be to such extent unenforcible and void: Provided, that noth-
ing in this subsection [e] shall apply to an agreement between a labor organi-
zation and an employer in the construction industry relating to the con-
tracting or subcontracting of work to be done at the site of the construction,





16. Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 100, 421 U.S. 616
(1973).
17. For an overview of the history and treatment of these issues, see generally
[Vol. 53
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text may subcontracting clauses be sought; 2) what is the jobsite; and 3) how
may a clause be obtained and/or enforced.
Of particular import in the section 8(e) area today is whether no-
doublebreasting clauses are protected by the section 8(e) proviso. Double-
breasting18 or a "dual shop" occurs when a union employer sets up a separate
company that operates nonunion.1 9 To be lawful, a doublebreasted operation
must be "legitimate;" it may not be a "sham" operation designed to remove
work from the unionized company.2" The principle control mechanism to pre-
vent employer abuse of doublebreasting is the single employer doctrine, which
disallows a dual shop operation where it is inappropriate.2
THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 1230-42 (C. Morris 2d ed. 1983); H. NORTHRUP, supra
note 5, at 41-72.
18. A doublebreasted operation may also be called a "dual shop." H. NOR-
THRUP, supra note 5, at 4.
19. Doublebreasting is explained as follows:
A 'double-breasted' operation is one in which a contractor operates two com-
panies, one unionized and the other nonunionized. Depending on how the
companies are structured and operated, each may be a separate corporation
or else both may be so interrelated that they constitute a single employer or
one may be the alter ego of the other. A collective-bargaining contract signed
by one of the companies would not bind the other if each were a separate
corporation, but would bind the other if both constituted a single employer
and the employees of both companies constitute a single appropriate bargain-
ing unit or the nonsignatory company is an alter ego of the signatory
company.
H. NORTHRUP, supra note 5, at 68 (quoting Walter N. Yoder & Sons, Inc., 270
N.L.R.B. 652 (1984)).
20. The Board summarized that sham operations are:
[S]ituations in which employers, through deception and misrepresentation,
used related companies to evade their obligations under collective-bargaining
agreements, to deprive bargaining unit employees of the fruits of collective
bargaining, and to destroy bargaining units. In those cases, the employers sur-
reptitiously and unilaterally transferred and shifted work away from bargain-
ing unit employees to employees of related companies.
H. NORTHRUP, supra note 5, at 65 (quoting A-1 Fire Protection, Inc., 250 N.L.R.B.
217, 218-19 (1980), remanded on other grounds, Road Sprinkler Fitters Local Union
No. 669 v. N.L.R.B., 676 F.2d 826 (D.C. Cir. 1982)).
21. The basic principles of the single employer doctrine are:
The single employer doctrine is a creation of the Board which allows it to
treat two or more related enterprises as one employer within the meaning of
section 2(2) of the NLRA .... The factors which the Board uses to determine
...single employer status are (1) interrelation of operations, (2) common
management, (3) centralized control of labor relations, and (4) common own-
ership .... The Board has stressed the first three of these factors, as well as
the presence of control of labor relations ....
A finding of single employer status does not by itself mean that all the
subentities comprising the single employer will be held bound by a contract
signed only by one. Instead, having found that two employers constitute a
single employer for purposes of the NLRA, the Board then goes on to make a
further determination whether the employees of both constitute an appropri-
ate bargaining unit.... In determining whether a single employer exists we
3
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Section 8(f) of the Act22 allows an employer "engaged primarily" 23 in the
construction industry to enter into an agreement with a construction union
whereby the employees of the employer will be represented by the union, even
though they have not yet been hired and a representation election has not been
held. The employer and union thus have entered into an agreement without
determining whether the majority of the employees want to be represented by
the union. This practice is only permitted in the construction industry.24 Mor-
ris states:
Such prehire contracts are deemed necessary because '[t]he traditional system
of recognition following the hiring of a work force and proof of the union's
majority status would be unworkable in an industry in which employers si-
multaneously work a number of construction projects in various geopraphical
areas, move from project to project in a relatively short time, and rely on
unions in each area to refer employees to the job site.'26
Although sections 8(e) and 8(f) already aid construction industry
are concerned with the common ownership, structure, and integrated control
of the separate corporations; in determining the scope of the unit, we are con-
cerned with the community of interests of the employees involved.
H. NORTHRUP, supra note 5, at 67 (quoting Samuel Kosoff & Sons, Inc., 269 N.L.R.B.
424, 427-28 (1984) (citations omitted)).
22. 29 U.S.C. § 158(f) (1982) provides:
It shall not be an unfair labor practice under subsections (a) and (b) of this
section for an employer engaged primarily in the building and construction
industry to make an agreement covering employees engaged (or who, upon
their employment, will be engaged) in the building and construction industry
with a labor organization of which building and construction employees are
members (not established, maintained, or assisted by any action defined in
section (a) of this section as an unfair labor practice) because (1) the major-
ity status of such labor organization has not been established under the provi-
sions of section 159 of this Act prior to the making of such agreement, or (2)
such agreement requires as a condition of employment, membership in such
labor organization after the seventh day following the beginning of such em-
ployment or the effective date of the agreement, whichever is later, or (3)
such agreement requires the employer to notify such labor organization of
opportunities for employment with such employer, or gives such labor organi-
zation an opportunity to refer qualified applicants for such employment, or
(4) such agreement specifies minimum training or experience qualifications
for employment or provides for priority in opportunities for employment based
upon length of service with such employer, in the industry or in the particular
geographical area: Provided, That nothing in this subsection shall set aside
the final proviso to subsection (a)(3) of this section: Provided further, That
any agreement which would be invalid, but for clause (1) of this subsection,




25. THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 1084 (C. Morris 2d ed. 1983) (quoting Barr
& Jacobson, The Enforceability of Construction Industry Prehire Agreements After
Higdon, 3 INDUS. REL. L.J. 517, 518 (1978)).
[Vol. 53
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unionization in ways not enjoyed by other industries, 6 supporters of building
trade unions recently have campaigned for major changes in the interpretation
and application of the NLRA provisions. These changes would make the un-
ions' treatment under the Act even more favorable. Additionally, proposed
amendments to the NLRA would radically affect the current use of both
doublebreasting and prehire agreements. This Comment will discuss both ac-
tual changes brought about by recent cases, and the impact of approval of the
proposed legislative changes.
II. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN DOUBLEBREASTING
Because of the increasing use by construction industry employers of
doublebreasting, 27 construction unions are seeking to incorporate anti-dual
shop clauses into their collective bargaining agreements.2 8 These clauses seek
to prevent a unionized construction employer from running a nonunionized sis-
ter operation, either on the same site or on other projects.
In a unique29 recent case, Painters District Council No. 51 (Manganaro
Corp.),3" a union's demand for an anti-dual shop clause was upheld against
charges by the employer that the clause violated section 8(e) of the NLRA. 1
The court found the clause to be a valid work preservation clause,32 and thus
26. H. NORTHRUP, supra note 5, at 35-40. It should be noted that § 8(e) also has
a proviso governing the clothing industry which is not within the scope of this
Comment.
27. H. NORTHRUP, supra note 5, attributes this phenomenon to the general ero-
sion of union influence, the higher cost of wages and benefits for union employees
which may no longer be justified by a correspondingly higher skill content, hours of
work restraints and compensation sought by unions, constraint of management preroga-
tives in personnel by union use of exclusive hiring halls, and the constraint of the union
craft organization structure. See generally id. at 14-31.
28. Painters & Allied Trades District Council No. 51 (Manganaro Corp.),
N.L.R.B. JD-313-86 (December 18, 1986).
29. Id. at 17 ("This case squarely presents the question of whether an anti-
double breasting clause is protected under the construction industry proviso to Section
8(e) of the Act.... I am not persuaded that any reported Board or Supreme Court
decision is dispositive of this issue."); Letter from G. Brockwel Heylin, National AGC
Liason to AGC Labor Lawyers Council (Jan. 15, 1987) ("This is believed to be the
only one of these cases decided arising from the recent campaign of the building trades
unions to eliminate dual shops.").
30. N.L.R.B. JD-313-86 (December 18, 1986).
31. Id.
32. The clause provided:
Section 1. To protect and preserve, for the employees covered by this Agree-
ment, all work they have performed and all work covered by this Agreement,
and to prevent any device of subterfuge to avoid the protection and preserva-
tion of such work, it is agreed as follows: If the Contractor performs on-site
construction work of the type covered by this Agreement, under its own name
or the name of another, as a corporation, company, partnership, or other busi-
ness entity, including a joint venture, wherein the Contractor, through its of-
ficers, directors, partners, owners or stockholders exercises directly or indi-
1988] 469
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the union's strike activity"3 in support of the clause was permissible. In Man-
ganaro,34 Manganaro Maryland was a drywall contractor subject to a Painters
District Council No. 35 contract in Boston. Under that agreement, when Man-
ganaro Maryland entered another jurisdiction to do drywall work, it was re-
quired to become a signatory to the local union-employer agreement. Manga-
naro entered the Washington, D.C. market and signed a "memorandum of
understanding" with the local union, thereby becoming subject to the terms of
that collective bargaining agreement. The agreement was negotiated between
the local union" and the Painting, Decorating and Drywall Finishing Contrac-
tors of Washington, D.C. and Vicinity, a multi-employer bargaining associa-
tion.36 When negotiations for a new collective bargaining agreement began,
Manganaro participated. The negotiations stalled over the employers' demand
rectly (including but not limited to management, control, or majority
ownership through family members), management, control, or majority own-
ership, the terms and conditions of this Agreement shall be applicable to all
such work.
Section 2. All charges of violations of Section I of this Article shall be consid-
ered as a dispute and shall be processed in accordance with the provisiofis of
this Agreement on the handling of grievances and the final and binding reso-
lution of disputes. As a remedy for violations of this Article, the Joint Trade
Board or Arbitrator shall be able, at the request of the Union, to require a
contractor to pay I) to affected employees covered by this Agreement, includ-
ing registered applicants for employment, the equivalent of wages those em-
ployees have lost because of the violations, and 2) into the affected Joint
Trust Funds to which this Agreement requires contributions any delinquent
contributions that resulted from the violations. This Section does not make
this remedy the exclusive remedy available to the Union for violation of this
Article; nor does it make the same or other remedies unavailable to the Union
for other violations of this Agreement.
Section 3. If, after a contractor has violated this Article, the Union and/or
Trustees of one or more Joint Trust Funds to which this Agreement requires
contributions institute legal action to enforce an award by an arbitrator or the
Joint Trade Board remedying such violations, or defend an action that seeks
to vacate such award, the Contractors shall pay any accountant's and/or at-
torney's fees incurred by the Union and/or Joint Trust Funds, plus costs of
the litigation, that have resulted from such legal action. This Section does not
affect other remedies, whether provided by law or this Agreement, that may
be available to the Union and/or the Joint Trust Funds.
Manganaro, N.L.R.B. JD-313-86 at 8.
33. The Union ceased referring employees to the employer, a drywall contractor.
Id. at 9.
34. The case is further complicated with an alter-ego question which is beyond
the scope of this Comment and has no apparent bearing on the outcome vis-a-vis the
doublebreasting issue.
35. The union here was actually three "mixed construction" local unions; Local
368, based in D.C.; Local 1773, based in suburban Maryland, and Local 890, based in
Alexandria, Virginia. Manganaro, N.L.R.B. JD-313-86 at 3.
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for a market recovery program37 and the union's demand for the work
preservation clause which became the issue in the case. The union ultimately
offered the two as a package and most of the employers signed the contract
just before the expiration of the collective bargaining agreement then in place.
Manganaro refused and the union ceased referring employees to Manganaro
jobsites.3 8 Manganaro filed charges against the union asserting that the strike
action constituted an "unfair labor practice" in that it violated sections
8(b)(3),39 8(b)(4)(i)(ii)(A)40 and 8(b)(4)(i)(ii)(B) 4' of the NLRA.
37. This "program" was designed to make the union contractors more competi-
tive by producing a twenty percent cut in labor costs. Manganaro, N.L.R.B. JD-313-86
at 4, n.6.
38. Manganaro, N.L.R.B. JD-313-86 at 9.
39. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(3) (1982) provides: "It shall be an unfair labor practice
for a labor organization or its agents - (3) to refuse to bargain collectively with an
employer, provided it is the representative of his employees subject to the provisions of
section 159(a) of this title." The § 8(b)(3) charge did not succeed. The clause was
found to be protected by § 8(e), therefore it was not an unfair labor practice for the
Union to refuse to bargain over it and to engage in strike activity to gain it once im-
passe was reached. Manganaro, N.L.R.B. JD-313-86 at 27.
40. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(i)(ii)(A) (1982) provides:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents
(4) (i) to engage in, or to induce or encourage any individual employed
by any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce to
engage in, a strike or a refusal in the course of his employment to use, manu-
facture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles,
materials, or commodities or to perform any services; or (ii) to threaten, co-
erce, or restrain any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting
commerce, where in either case an object thereof is -
(A) forcing or requiring any employer or self-employed person to join any
labor or employer organization or to enter into any agreement which is pro-
hibited by subsection (e) of this section.
Id.
41. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(i)(ii)(B) (1982) provides:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents
(4) (i) to engage in, or to induce or encourage any individual employed
by any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce to
engage in, a strike or a refusal in the course of his employment to use, manu-
facture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles,
materials, or commodities or to perform any services; or (ii) to threaten, co-
erce, or restrain any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting
commerce, where in either case an object thereof is
(B) forcing or requiring any person to cease using, selling, handling, trans-
porting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer, processor,
or manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other person, or forcing
or requiring any other employer to recognize or bargain with a labor organi-
zation as the representative of his employees unless such labor organization
1988]
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The ultimate issue of the case hinged on whether the anti-dual shop
clause was a valid work preservation clause. If so, the construction industry
proviso section 8(e) of the Act protected it from being an unfair labor practice
violating section 8(b)(4)(i)(ii)(A). 42 The Administrative Law Judge used four
lines of reasoning to reach the conclusion that the clause, though an anti-dual
shop clause, was a valid work preservation clause and thus protected by sec-
tion 8(e).43
First, he considered the clause in light of four cases cited by the parties
that "developed certain principles which provide a framework within which
the question may be resolved.""1 In the first of these cases, NLRB v. Local
217, United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing and
Pipefitting Industry (The Carvel Co.),45 the NLRB examined a clause similar
to the one in Manganaro. The union was charged with a violation of section
8(e) for entering into a collective bargaining agreement which contained the
following clause:
The employer agrees that no journeyman or apprentice who is a member of
Local 217 ... will be assigned to work or expected to work or required to
work, on any job or project on which a worker or person, is performing any
work within the jurisdiction of Local No. 217, if said worker or person is
performing such work for wages, or hours or under any conditions of employ-
ment, which are different from those established by this Agreement."
Although holding that the clause was secondary in nature, and thus
within the general proscription of section 8(e), the NLRB found that the
clause was generally protected by the construction industry proviso.47 How-
has been certified as the representative of such employees under the provisions
of section 159 of this title: Provided, That nothing contained in this clause (B)
shall be construed to make unlawful, where not otherwise unlawful, any pri-
mary strike or primary picketing.
Id.
The § 8(b)(4)(i)(ii)(B) charge did not succeed because the A.L.J. found that assuming,
arguendo, that the Union was striking Manganaro for an object proscribed by §
8(b)(4), Manganaro and the other employers in question were single employers. Man-
ganaro, N.L.R.B. JD-313-86 at 30.
42. Manganaro, N.L.R.B. JD-313-86 at 17.
43. The A.L.J. first considered two threshold issues: 1) whether the clause pur-
ported to deal with the relationship between the signatory employer and any other
"employer" or "person" under the NLRA and 2) whether the clause was an agreement
to cease doing business with others under section 8(e). He answered both questions
affirmatively and thus found a prima facie case against the union existed. He then
turned to the inquiry of whether.the clause, although within the proscription of § 8(e),
could be excepted from it. Manganaro, N.L.R.B. JD-313-86 at 15-17.
44. Id. at 17.
45. 152 N.L.R.B. 1672 (1965), affd in part and rev'd in part, 361 F.2d 160 (Ist
Cir. 1966).
46. Manganaro, N.L.R.B. JD-313-86 at 17 (quoting Carvel, 152 N.L.R.B. at
1674).
47. General Counsel's argument in Carvel that the clause did not merit protec-
tion because it did not follow the statutory language and refer specifically to the "con-
[Vol. 53
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ever, the Board also held that the clause was unprotected by the construction
industry proviso in that it "incorporated into the contract self-enforcement
terms which permitted employees to engage in work stoppages in reliance upon
the clause."'48 The A.L.J. in Manganaro concluded that the only "pertinent"
difference between the Carvel clause and the clause in the present case was
that "the Carvel clause was limited in its applicability to jobsites where the
signatory employer's employees were or might be engaged at work, whereas
the present clause is not so limited. '49 He concluded the comparison by
stating:
In Carvel, the Board carefully explained that the construction industry pro-
viso is not limited to situations involving the contracting of work to or from
the signatory employer. Rather, as demonstrated by Carvel, the protection
afforded by the proviso extends to the contracting or subcontracting of jobsite
work among firms which may not even be related to the signatory employer.
The instant clause is directly addressed to the contracting or subcontracting
of jobsite work, in that it is designed to restrict 'doublebreasting' i.e. the con-
tracting or subcontracting of 'on-site construction work' on a nonunion basis
by related firms which also contract or subcontract on a union basis.50
In the second case, International Union of Operating Engineers Local 542
(York County Bridge),51 the NLRB held the following "dual company" clause
to be secondary in nature and hence beyond the protection of the construction
industry proviso:
Section 11-Non-Union Equipment:
(a) No operator shall be required to operate equipment belonging to a
contractor or supplier with whom this Local Union is not in signed relations
provided Union equipment is available in the locality. No party to this agree-
ment shall rent or supply equipment unmanned to anyone doing construction
work covered by this agreement who is not in signed relations with this
Union.
(b) No employee represented by this Union on construction work shall be
required to operate equipment of or for any Employer who has any interest in
a firm or company doing construction work within the jurisdiction of this
tracting out" or "subcontracting" of work was rejected by the NLRB as sacrificing
"substance to form." In addition, the failure of the clause to be limited in applicability
to work for which the employer holds a contract or subcontract was not fatal to it.
"The Board concluded that 'consequently... the failure of [the clause] to refer specifi-
cally to 'contracting out' or 'subcontracting' and the fact that it may affect persons and
employers with whom [the signatory subcontractor] has no contractual relationship
does not bar application of the proviso here.'" Id. at 17-18 (quoting Carvel, 152
N.L.R.B. at 1677).
48. Id. at 18 (the Court of Appeals in Carvel did not agree with the analysis that
the clause incorporated self-help provisions and enforced the Board's order as to the
prohibited strike conduct only).
49. Manganaro, N.L.R.B. JD-313-86 at 19.
50. Id.
51. 216 N.L.R.B. 408 (1975), enforced, 532 F.2d 902 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. de-
nied, 429 U.S. 1072 (1977).
1988]
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Union and which is not in signed relations with this Union. 2
Thus, the threat by the Union to engage in a work stoppage if the employer
did not sign a multi-employer contract that contained the clause was an unfair
labor practice under section 8(b)(4)(ii)(A). Addressing York County Bridge,
the A.L.J. in Manganaro stated:
In sum, the Board held that the clauses were not protected by the proviso
because they restricted the signatory employer from performing work at job-
sites where nonunion labor was not present. The Board also found that Local
542 violated Section 8(b)(3) of the Act. However, the Board did not find that
the clauses were unlawful or unprotected by the proviso for this reason.
Rather the Board's finding was based on two other grounds. First, the finding
was based on Local 542's insistence that it would not permit York to sign the
contract unless York agreed to take steps to bring Wagman, its parent com-
pany, under the contract. Indeed York itself asked to sign the contract. The
Board concluded that Local 542 thereby conditioned negotiations on enlarge-
ment of the bargaining unit, a nonmandatory subject of bargaining. Second,
the Board held that Local 542 further violated Section 8(b)(3) by holding the
negotiations hostage to another nonmandatory subject of bargaining, namely,
its demand for contract provisions banned by Section 8(e). On review, the
Court of Appeals affirmed the Board's decision.5 3
If the A.L.J. ended his case analysis with York County Bridge, he would
not have approved the clause in Manganaro.54 He continued, however, with
two cases.55 In Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local
100,56 the Supreme Court ruled that the section 8(e) proviso "'extends only to
agreements in the context of collective-bargaining relationships,' and 'possibly
to common-situs relationships on particular jobsites as well.' 57 However, the
Court questioned, albeit by implication, the latter limitation, 58 and later the
Connell decision was narrowed in scope "to the issue there presented, i.e. the
validity of hot cargo agreements obtained outside of the context of a collective-
52. Manganaro, N.L.R.B. JD-313-86 at 20.
53. Id. at 20-21.
54. Id. at 21.
55. "York County Bridge is no longer viable law . . . ." Id. at 22.
56. 421 U.S. 616 (1975).
57. Manganaro, N.L.R.B. JD-313-86 at 21 (quoting Connell, 421 U.S. at 627,
630).
58. The A.L.J. stated:
Specifically, the Court cited its earlier decision in National Woodwork,
for the proposition that the proviso was 'a measure designed to allow agree-
ments pertaining to certain secondary activities on the construction site be-
cause of the close community of interests there,' but observed that 'other
courts have suggested that it serves an even narrower function ... to alleviate
the frictions that may arise when union m~n work alongside nonunioli men on
the same construction site.'
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bargaining relationship."59
The last case which the A.L.J. considered was Carpenters Local 944,
United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners (Woelke & Romero Framing,
Inc.) v. NLRB.60 The A.L.J. characterized the clause in Woelke & Romero as
"far broader in its organizational implications than the present clause""1 in
that the clause in Woelke & Romero "covered all jobsite work, [and] was
designed to benefit not only the signatory union, but all building trades un-
ions."62 In contrast, the clause in Manganaro was "expressly limited to bar-
gaining unit type work, when performed by firms affiliated with the signatory
employer through common management, control or majority ownership." 6 3 For
these reasons, the A.L.J. concluded that "on its face, the present clause re-
flects at least an arguable unit work preservation purpose which was plainly
inconsistent with the broadly worded clauses involved in Carvel and Woelke &
Romero [and therefore the clause is permissible]."4
Next, the A.L.J. examined the legislative history of section 8(e) and the
construction industry proviso to see how the clause in Manganaro fared
against that background. Concluding that the issue here was "whether the
proviso should be interpreted in a flexible or a rigid manner" 65 and that "[t]he
key legislative history indicates a flexible approach,"66 he quoted Senator John
F. Kennedy:67
Senator John F. Kennedy, speaking on behalf of the Senate conferees, stated
that the proviso applied not only to 'promises not to subcontract work on a
construction site to a nonunion subcontractor,' i.e., conventional no-subcon-
tracting clauses, which 'appear to be legal today,' but also to 'all other agree-
ments involving undertakings not to do work on a construction project site
with other contractors or subcontractors regardless of the precise relationship
between them.' 105 Cong. Rec. 17900 (1959), II Legis. Hist. 1433. Senator
Kennedy could not have anticipated that more than two decades later, con-
struction unions would regard double-breasting as a major problem in connec-
59. Id. at 22. See Woelke & Romero Framing, Inc. v. NLRB, 456 U.S. 645, 654
(1982).
60. 239 N.L.R.B. 241 (1978), enforced en banc sub nom. Pacific N.W. Chapter
of the Associated Builders & Contracters, Inc. v. NLRB, 654 F.2d 1301 (9th Cir.
1981), afl'd in pertinent part, 456 U.S. 645 (1982). See infra notes 75-99 and accom-
panying text for a discussion of this case.




65. Id. (rejecting General Counsel's argument on behalf of the employers that
the issue involved "whether the construction industry proviso should be interpreted in
an 'expansive or dynamic' manner").
66. Id.
67. It was noted that "'[s]ince the proviso was added to Section 8(e) at the
Senate conferees' insistence, and since Senator Kennedy was chairman of the Senate
conferees, his explanation of the clause is entitled to substantial weight.'" Id. (quoting
Woelke & Romero 456 U.S. at 656 n.9).
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tion with jobsite work. Nevertheless, his statement makes clear that the 8(e)
proviso was not simply intended to apply to clauses in common use in 1959,
whose legality had been determined, but to future attempts by unions to deal
with industry problems, without limitation as to nature of the relationship
between the contractors and subcontractors involved. 8
Thus, the legislative history strengthened the argument in favor of the clause.
The third issue addressed is really the key inquiry regarding the status of
the anti-dual shop clause: whether the clause is indeed a valid work preserva-
tion clause under the Act and whether it should apply to separate employers
who are affiliated with the signatory employers. The A.L.J. answered yes to
both questions, relying on Woelke & Romero,69 and Berman Enterprises, Inc.
v. Local 333, United Marine Division, International Longshoremen's Associa-
tion.7 0 In Berman, a clause described as "a maritime equivalent of a no-double
breasting clause" 71 was upheld as primary - a work preservation clause -
without the benefit of the section 8(e) proviso.2 The court found that the ob-
jective of the clause was preservation of work which the employees tradition-
ally performed and that the award of the questioned work was in the control
of the contracting employer. Following this rationale, the A.L.J. in
Mangonaro concluded:
[T]he Court [in Berman] held that 'the Union's conduct also is not vulnerable
to Berman's 'right to control' argument because the Union did not coerce
Association members to obtain work for the Union that the members had no
right or power to assign.' It is evident that the Court interpreted the phrases
'affiliated company' and 'subsidiary company' as encompassing entities which
had the right or power to assign unit work. Indeed the courts have long held,
in sum, that separate employer status does not guarantee absolute protection
under Section 8(b)(4)(A) and (B) of the Act, that union pressure directed
against one employer, in furtherance of a dispute over the conditions of a
separate employer of self-employed persons, may be lawful where the union
can demonstrate a work preservation objection, coupled with actual or poten-
tial control of such conditions by the struck or signatory employer.73
Finally, the A.L.J. noted that separate employer status did not automati-
cally protect the separate employer from union action. If the union's objective
was work preservation, the clause in Manganaro should be protected by the
68. Id. (emphasis added).
69. 456 U.S. 645 (1982). See infra notes 75-99 and accompanying text.
70. 644 F.2d 930 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 965 (1981).
71. Manganaro, N.L.R.B. JD-313-86 at 24. The clause provided: "Section 1.
Application Agreement[.] This agreement applies only to all licensed and unlicensed
Employees, employed on tugboats and self-propelled lighters owned or operated by the
Employers, a subsidiary company, an affiliated company or a company division in the
Port of New York and vicinity." Id. (emphasis original).
72. Because the case was decided as an antitrust action, the labor law questions
were decided as incidental to the federal suit. See Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers &
Steamfitters Local 100, 421 U.S. 616, 626 (1975).
73. Manganaro, N.L.R.B. JD-313-86 at 24-25 (citations omitted) (emphasis in
original).
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section 8(e) proviso because it dealt with related firms.74 Because the anti-
doublebreasting clause was protected by the section 8(e) proviso, the union did
not engage in an unfair labor practice under section 8(b)(4)(i)(ii)(A) by strik-
ing to obtain a contract containing the clause.7 5
The recent case of Carpenters Local 944, United Brotherhood of
Carpenters and Joiners v. NLRB (Woelke & Romero Framing, Inc.) also
interpreted section 8(e). 78 In Woelke, the Supreme Court consolidated two
cases to address two issues. One issue was whether union signatory subcon-
tracting clauses are protected by the construction industry proviso to section
8(e) when they are sought or negotiated in a collective bargaining relationship.
The other issue was whether it is a violation of section 8(b)(4)(A) of the
NLRA for a union to picket so as to obtain a lawful subcontracting clause.77
In the first case, Woelke & Romero Framing, a framing contractor, and the
United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America (Carpenters) en-
tered negotiations for a successor agreement to their collective bargaining
agreement which was about to expire. The parties reached an impasse over the
inclusion of a signatory subcontracting clause (similar to one in the expiring
contract) which provided:
The Contractor agrees that neither he nor any of his subcontractors on the
jobsite will subcontract any work to be done at the site of construction, altera-
tion, painting or repair of a building, structure or other work (including quar-
ries, rock, san[d] and gravel plants, asphalt plants, ready-mix concrete plants,
established on or adjacent to the jobsite to process or supply materials for the
convenience of the Contractor for jobsite use) except to a person, firm or
corporation, party to an appropriate, current labor agreement with the ap-
propriate Union, or subordinate body signatory to this Agreement.7 8
Some work stoppages occurred when two Carpenters locals picketed in support
of the clause's inclusion at Woelke's construction sites. Woelke filed charges
74. The A.L.J. reasoned:
Plainly, if a union may under Section 8(b)(4)(B), in furtherance of a
work preservation objective, engage in economic pressure against related or
integrated firms which do not meet the single employer test, then it is difficult
to see why the Section 8(e) proviso, which expressly permits secondary agree-
ments in the construction industry, should not be construed as permitting
agreements which apply to related firms.
Id. at 25. The A.L.J. rejected the argument that since legislation regarding the status
of clauses similar to the one at issue was pending in Congress, the clause here was
illegal. Id. at 25 n.20. See infra notes 172-82 and accompanying text for a discussion of
the legislation proposed.
75. The Manganaro decision has subsequently been appealed to the NLRB. As
of the time of publication, decision by the Board was pending. Questions regarding its
outcome may be directed to National Labor Relations Board, Executive Secretary,
1717 Pennsylvania Avenue N.W., Washington, D.C. 20570. The case number needed
for inquiry is 5-CC-1036.
76. 456 U.S. 645 (1982).
77. Id. at 647-48.
78. Id. at 649 n.1 (emphasis added).
1988] 477
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with the Board, arguing that the clause violated section 8(e) and thus the
Carpenters picketing in support of the clause violated section
8(b)(4)(i)(ii)(A).79 Although the Board agreed the clause was secondary in
nature, it held the clause protected by the section 8(e) proviso. Quoting Con-
nell Construction Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 100,80 the Board con-
cluded it was lawful to seek a signatory subcontracting clause "in the context
of a collective bargaining relationship,"'" and thus it was not unlawful to
picket to obtain a subcontracting clause.8
In the second case, the legality of a similar clause 83 was challenged before
the Board by an employer-member of a multi-employer bargaining association.
The employer asserted that the inclusion of the clause in a collective bargain-
ing agreement between the construction employers association8 ' and the
Union85 violated section 8(e) of the NLRA. The Board, following the reason-
ing examined above, held the signatory subcontracting clause was protected by
the construction industry proviso. However, the clause included a provision for
self-help enforcement.8" The Board held that this provision was not protected
by the proviso.8 7
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the Board, reasoning:
[T]he proviso was designed solely to minimize friction between union and
nonunion workers employed at the same jobsite. Thus, the proviso shelters
subcontracting clauses 'only where a collective bargaining relationship exists
and even then only when the employer or his subcontractor has employees
who are members of the signatory union at work at some time at the jobsite
at which the employer wishes to engage a nonunion subcontractor.' 8
However, on rehearing the case, en bane, the court of appeals enforced the
Board's orders.89
79. Section 8(b)(4)(i)(ii)(A) is set out supra note 40.
80. 421 U.S. 616 (1975). See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text.
81. Woelke, 456 U.S. at 650.
82. Id.
83. The clause provided: "Employers shall not contract any work covered by this
Agreement to be done at the site of the construction, alteration, painting, or repair of a
building, structure, or other work to any person, firm or company who does not have an
existing labor agreement with the Union covering such work." Id. at 650 n.3.
84. Oregon-Columbia Chapter of the Associated General Contractors of
America, Inc.
85. Local 701 of the International Union of Operating Engineers, AFL-CIO.
86. "[T]he agreement authorized Engineers to take 'such action as they deem
necessary,' including strikes and other economic self-help, to enforce awards obtained
through the grievance and arbitration process on matters covered by the agreement."
Woelke, 456 U.S. at 650.
87. Id. at 651.
88. Id. (quoting 609 F.2d 1341, 1347 (1979) (three-judge panel)). The panel did
not reach the picketing issue since it found the subcontracting clauses illegal.
89. It held that "union signatory subcontracting clauses are protected so long as
they are sought or negotiated in the context of a collective-bargaining relationship,"
and that "economic pressure may be used to obtain a subcontracting agreement, but..
[Vol. 53
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The Supreme Court held the clauses at issue fell within the prohibition of
section 8(e), leaving the issue whether they were protected by the construction
industry proviso.90 In answer to the question, the Court first relied on Connell
Construction Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 1009' for the proposition
that the proviso "'must be interpreted in light of the statutory setting and the
circumstances surrounding its enactment.' "92 It thus rejected the employers'
argument that the section 8(e) proviso should only be applicable to protect
clauses which cover construction sites where both union and nonunion workers
are present.93 Instead, the Court adopted a broader interpretation based on the
legislative history of section 8(e) and of the construction industry proviso. 4
Noting that "petitioners [employers] are unable to point to any pre-1959 cases
in which a subcontracting agreement was found to be unlawful because it was
not limited to particular jobsites at which the signatory union workers were
. it may not be employed to enforce a subcontracting agreement." Id. at 652 (citing
654 F.2d 1301, 1322-24 (1981)).
Id. at 653.
90. Id. at 653.
91. 421 U.S. 616 (1975). See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text.
92. Woelke, 456 U.S. at 653 (quoting Connell, 421 U.S. at 628).
93. This interpretation would virtually wipe out the effectiveness of anti-dual
shop clauses since a principle target of them is all operations of the signatory contrac-
tor, i.e. they are a direct attack upon doublebreasting as a practice. The employers
suggested the § 8(e) proviso was a response to NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Const. Trades
Council (Denver Building Trades), 341 U.S. 675 (1951), and should thus be viewed as
an effort to eliminate jobsite friction only, in accord with the scope of Denver Building
Trades. Woelke, 456 U.S. at 661-66.
94. See supra notes 12-21, 65-67 and accompanying text. In short, the Court
concluded that § 8(e) in its current form was adopted as a compromise between bills
advanced by the House and the Senate and was in response to the "loophole" created
by the decision in Local 1976, United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners v. NLRB
(Sand Door), 357 U.S. 93 (1958). In Sand Door, the Court held that construction
employers and unions could enter "hot cargo" agreements voluntarily, but that unions
could not use self-help to enforce these agreements. The Congress, in considering the
1959 amendments, concluded that this was not the state of the law in practice and that
in order to preserve the status quo the proviso to § 8(e) was needed. Woelke, 456 U.S.
at 657-60. In the words of Senator Kennedy:
The first proviso under new section 8(e) of the National Labor Relations
Act is intended to preserve the present state of the law with respect to picket-
ing at the site of a construction project and with respect to the validity of
agreements relating to the contracting of work to be done at the site of the
construction project.
The Landrum-Griffin bill extended the 'hot cargo' provisions of the Sen-
ate bill, which we applied only to Teamsters, to all agreements between an
employer and a labor union by which the employer agrees not to do business
with another concern. The Senate insisted upon a qualification for the cloth-
ing and apparel industries and for agreements relating to work to be done at
the site of a construction project. Both changes were necessary to avoid seri-
ous damage to the pattern of collective bargaining in these industries. Id. at
656 (citations omitted) (emphasis original).
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employed," '95 the Court concluded:
In short, Congress believed that broad subcontracting clauses similar to those
at issue here were part of the pattern of collective bargaining prior to 1959,
and that the Board and the courts had found them to be lawful. This percep-
tion was apparently accurate. Thus, endorsing the clauses at issue here is fully
consistent with the legislative history of § 8(e) and the construction industry
proviso.9 6
The employers argued that allowing unions this strong a tool with which
to work for their goals was "top-down" organizing and therefore impermissi-
ble. Asserting that top-down organizing has its limits, 9 the Court stated:
It is also true that secondary subcontracting agreements like those at issue
here create top-down organizing pressure .... The bare assertion that a par-
ticular subcontracting agreement encourages top-down organizing pressure
does not resolve the issue we confront in these cases: how much top-down
pressure did Congress intend to tolerate when it decided to exempt construc-
tion site projects from § 8(e)? As we have already explained, we believe that
Congress endorsed subcontracting agreements obtained in the context of a
collective-bargaining relationship-and decided to accept whatever top-down
pressure such clauses might entail. Congress concluded that the community of
interests on the construction jobsite justified the top-down organizational con-
sequences that might attend the protection of legitimate collective-bargaining
objectives."8
Whether unions may picket to obtain a signatory subcontracting clause
such as those in issue remained an open question in Woelke.9  The Court con-
cluded that the Ninth Circuit did not have jurisdiction to rule on the issue
because none of the parties before the Board had raised the issue.100 Section
10(e)101 of the NLRA thus barred court review of the issue.
95. Woelke, 456 U.S. at 659.
96. Id. at 660.
97. See id. at 664-65. The limits listed included: (I) "A subcontractor cannot be
subjected to unlimited picketing to force it into a union agreement without regard to
the wishes of its employees"; (2) If a subcontractor's general contractor is subject to a
subcontracting clause, the subcontractor may use the § 8(f) prehire agreement mecha-
nism to remain eligible for work. If the subcontractor's employees choose to do so, they
may file an election petition to challenge the union's majority status. Under certain
circumstances, the subcontractor may repudiate the prehire agreement; (3) Under 29
U.S.C. § 158(a)(3), (b)(2), a union may not discriminate in employee referral from
hiring halls on the basis of union membership; (4) The only absolute membership re-
quirement in the presence of a union security clause is dues, i.e. a § 8(a)(3) member;
(5) "[E]mployees working for firms with whom a construction union has a primary
dispute are protected against secondary picketing designed to force them off their cur-
rent job."
98. Woelke, 456 U.S. at 663.
99. Id. at 666 ("[W]e do not reach the question whether the picketing was
lawful.").
100. Id.
101. 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1982) provides in pertinent part: "No objection that
has not been urged before the Board, its member, agent, or agency, shall be considered
16
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III. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN PREHIRE AGREEMENTS
The key issue regarding prehire agreements is just how much deference
they will be given. Will a prehire agreement be treated like a collective bar-
gaining agreement entered following a full-blown election with a showing of
majority employee support, or as something less? The NLRB's position on the
issue is often dispositive.102 Traditionally, prehire agreements have been
treated as something less.103 But the Board's (and the courts') position on the
issue is changing as they consider it, and an appropriate theme for this move-
ment could be: "An administrative agency is not disqualified from changing its
mind."104
In NLRB v. Local Union No. 103, Bridge Workers (Higdon),105 the Su-
preme Court upheld the NLRB determination (reversing the court of appeals)
that "it is an unfair labor practice within the meaning of § 158(b)(7)(C)0 6 for
by the court, unless the failure or neglect to urge such objection shall be excused be-
cause of extraordinary circumstances."
102. The Supreme Court described the Board's power:
The Board's resolution of the conflicting claims in this case represents a
defensible construction of the statute and is entitled to considerable deference.
Courts may prefer a different application of the relevant sections, but "[tihe
function of striking that balance to effectuate national labor policy is often a
difficult and delicate responsibility, which the Congress committed primarily
to the National Labor Relations Board, subject to limited judicial review." Of
course, "recognition of the appropriate sphere of the administrative power...
obviously cannot exclude all judicial review of the Board's actions." But we
cannot say that the Board has here "[moved] into a new area of regulation
which Congress [has] not committed to it."
NLRB v. Local Union No. 103, Bridge Workers (Higdon), 434 U.S. 335, 350 (1978)
(citations omitted).
103. See generally THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 650-53, 1083-85, 1384-86
(C. Morris 2d ed. 1983).
104. Higdon, 434 U.S. at 351.
105. 434 U.S. 335 (1978).
106. NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7)(C) (1982) provides:
(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its
agents-
(7) to picket or cause to be picketed, or threaten to picket or cause to be
picketed, any employer where an object thereof is forcing or requiring an em-
ployer to recognize or bargain with a labor organization as the representative
of his employees, or forcing or requiring the employees of an employer to
accept or select such labor organization as their collective bargaining repre-
sentative, unless such labor organization is currently certified as the represen-
tative of such employees:
(C) where such picketing has been conducted without a petition under section
159(c) of this title being filed within a reasonable period of time not to exceed
thirty days from the commencement of such picketing: Provided, That when
such a petition has been filed the Board shall forthwith, without regard to the
provisions of section 159(c)(1) of this title or the absence of a showing of a
17
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an uncertified union not representing a majority of the employees to engage in
extended picketing in an effort to enforce a prehire agreement with the em-
ployer.1 10 7 The employer, Higdon Construction Co., was party to a prehire
agreement with Local 103 of the Bridge Workers.108 During that time, Higdon
Contracting Co. was formed to engage in nonunion construction work. Local
103 picketed two Higdon Contracting sites, one for more than 30 days, with-
out filing for a representation election. In response to Higdon Contracting fil-
ing section 8(b)(7)(C) charges against Local 103, an A.L.J. found no violation
by the union.109 While the Board disagreed, the court of appeals set aside the
Board's determination. The Supreme Court outlined the Board's position as
follows:
Under the Board's view of § 8(f), a prehire agreement does not entitle a mi-
nority union to be treated as the majority representative of the employees
until and unless it attains majority support in the relevant unit. Until that
time the prehire agreement is voidable and does not have the same stature as
a collective-bargaining contract entered into with a union actually represent-
ing a majority of the employees and recognized as such by the employer. Ac-
cordingly, the Board holds, as it did here, that picketing by a minority union
to enforce a prehire agreement that the employer refuses to honor, effectively
has the object of attaining recognition as the bargaining representative with
majority support among the employees, and is consequently violative of §8(b)(7)(C).11 °
substantial interest on the part of the labor organization, direct an election in
such unit as the Board finds to be appropriate and shall certify the results
thereof: Provided further, That nothing in this subparagraph (C) shall be
construed to prohibit any picketing or other publicity for the purpose of truth-
fully advising the public (including consumers) that an employer does not em-
ploy members of, or have a contract with, a labor organization, unless an
effect of such picketing is to induce any individual employed by any other
person in the course of his employment, not to pick up, deliver or transport
any goods or not to perform any services.
Nothing in this paragraph (7) shall be construed to permit any act which
would otherwise be an unfair labor practice under this subsection.
Id.
107. Higdon, 434 U.S. at 338 (footnote omitted).
108. Higdon Construction agreed to "abide by the terms of the multi-employer
understanding between Local 103 and the Tri-State Iron Workers Employers Associa-
tion, Inc." Id. at 339. The agreement did not contain a union security clause.
109. Id. The A.L.J. found that the two employers "were legally indistinct for
purposes of the proceedings" and that the prehire agreement was legally entered. Thus,
"[tihe picketing was for purposes of obtaining compliance with an existing contract,
rather than to obtain recognition or bargaining as an initial matter. Only the latter was
a purpose forbidden by § 8(b)(7)."
110. Higdon, 434 U.S. at 341. In support of its position, the Board cited its
opinion in R.J. Smith Constr. Co., 191 N.L.R.B. 693 (1971), enf. denied sub nom.,
Operating Engineers Local 150 v. NLRB, 480 F.2d 1186 (D.C. Cir. 1973), overruled
by NLRB v. Local Union No. 103, Ass'n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron
Workers, 434 U.S. 335 (1978). The D.C. Circuit set aside the Board's determination in
the current case, as it did R.J. Smith:
18
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The Court concluded that "the Board's construction of the Act, although
perhaps not the only tenable one, is an acceptable reading of the statutory
language and a reasonable implementation of the purposes of the relevant stat-
utory sections.""' To do so, it looked to the general rule of section 8(b)(7)(C),
the policy behind that rule, the construction industry proviso under section
8(f), and the limitations on the exception for the construction industry. Under
section 8(b)(7)(C), it is an unfair labor practice for a union to picket to force
an employer "to recognize or bargain with" the union. 1 2 The policy behind
this prohibition is "the generally prevailing statutory policy that a union
should not purport to act as the collective bargaining agent for all unit em-
ployees, and may not be recognized as such, unless it is the voice of the major-
ity of the employees in the unit.""1 " Section 8(f) provides an exception to this
general rule for the construction industry, permitting contractors and unions to
enter into prehire agreements. 1 4 However, there are several limitations on this
exception, including: 1) the union does not enjoy a presumption of majority
status during the term of a prehire agreement, as it does during the existence
of a collective bargaining agreement; 2) the employers, employees, or union
may petition for a representation election during the term of a prehire agree-
ment; 3) the employer may repudiate the prehire agreement and refuse to bar-
gain with the union, absent a showing of majority support by the union. 15
The Court of Appeals ruled that the validity of a § 8(f) prehire contract
carried with it the right to enforce that contract by picketing, and the right as
well, when breach of the agreement occurs, to file and prevail on an unfair
labor practice charge against the employer for failure to bargain. This eleva-
tion of a nonmajority union to the rights of majority status was acceptable, in
the court's view, because of the second proviso to § 8(f), which denies the
usual contract bar protection to prehire agreements and permits a representa-
tion election to be held at the instance of either party at any time during the
life of the agreement.
Higdon, 434 U.S. at 340.
111. Higdon, 434 U.S. at 341.
112. Id. at 343 (citing Building & Constr. Trades Council (Sullivan Electric
Co.), 146 N.L.R.B. 1086 (1964)).
113. Id. at 344 (citing NLRA § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982) (employees have "the
right to bargain collectively with representatives of their own choosing"); § 9(a) of the
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (bargaining representative must have been selected by a ma-
jority of the employees); § 8(a)(1)-(2) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1)-(2) (it is an
unfair labor practice for an employer to interfere with employee selection of their rep-
resentative); § 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A) (it is an unfair labor
practice for a union to interfere with employee selection of their representative); Gar-
ment Workers v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731, 737 (1961) ("'There could be no clearer
abridgement of § 7 of the Act'. . . than to grant 'exclusive bargaining status to an
agency selected by a minority of its employees, thereby impressing that agent upon the
nonconsenting majority.' This is true even though the employer and the union believe in
good faith, but mistakenly, that the union has obtained majority support.")).
114. See supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text for a brief discussion of
prehire agreements.
115. Higdon, 434 U.S. at 345 (quoting Ruttman Constr. Co., 191 N.L.R.B. 701,
(1971). A "prehire agreement is merely a preliminary step that contemplates further
1988]
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Applying the above principles, the Court accepted the Board's view that:
[W]hen the union picketed to enforce its prehire agreement, Higdon could
challenge the union's majority standing by filing a § 8(b)(7) charge and could
prevail, as Higdon did here, because the union admittedly lacked majority
credentials at the picketed projects. Absent these qualifications, the collective-
bargaining relationship and the union's entitlement to act as the exclusive
bargaining agent had never matured. Picketing to enforce the § 8(f) contract
was the legal equivalent of picketing to require recognition as the exclusive
agent, and § 8(b)(7)(C) was infringed when the union failed to request an
election within 30 days."1
A second recent case of import to the interpretation of section 8(f) is Jim
McNeff, Inc. v. Todd.117 In that case, the Supreme Court held that "monetary
obligations that have accrued under a prehire contract . . . can be enforced,
prior to the repudiation of such a contract, in a suit brought by a union
against an employer under § 301118 . . . absent proof that the union repre-
sented a majority of the employees."' 19
The general contractor in this case was subject to a Master Labor Agree-
ment120 which contained a signatory subcontracting clause 21 and a union se-
action for the development of a full bargaining relationship." Id. at 702).
116. Higdon, 434 U.S. at 346. The Court cited the legislative history of §
8(b)(7) and § 8(f) as supportive of this view. Noting that both were added to further
the goal of allowing employees a free choice of their bargaining representative, the
Court quoted its decision in Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local
Union No. 100, 421 U.S. 616, (1975) that "[o]ne of the major aims of the 1959 Act
was to limit 'top-down' organizing campaigns, in which unions used economic weapons
to force recognition from an employer regardless of the wishes of his employees." Id. at
632.
117. 461 U.S. 260 (1983), aff'g 677 F.2d 800 (9th Cir. 1982).
118. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 301(a), 29 U.S.C. §
185 (1982). Section 301 of the LMRA provides in pertinent part:
(a) Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor or-
ganization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as de-
fined in this chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be
brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the
parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the
citizenship of the parties.
Id.
119. McNeff, 461 U.S. at 262, 271-72.
120. The agreement was between the International Union of Operating Engi-
neers, Local No. 12, and the Southern California General Contractors Associations. Id.
at 262.
121. Article IV, § D of the contract provided:
The Contractor agrees that neither he nor any of his subcontractors on
the jobsite will subcontract any work to be done at the site of construction,
alteration, painting or repair of a building, structure or other work (including
quarries, rock, sand and gravel plants, asphalt plants, ready-mix concrete
plants, established on or adjacent to the jobsite to process or supply materials
for the convenience of the Contractor for jobsite use), except to a person, firm
or corporation, party to an appropriate, current labor agreement with the ap-
20
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curity clause requiring even employees of subcontractors to be union mem-
bers.1 22 Jim McNeff, Inc., a subcontractor on the site, became a signatory to
the Master Labor Agreement and under the terms of the agreement was re-
quired to make contributions to employee benefit trust funds. McNeff did not
make the contributions and, in fact, falsified the monthly reports to the funds
regarding the contributions. 123 When the trustees of the funds requested an
audit, McNeff agreed but delayed the audit. The trustees brought suit under
section 301124 "to compel an accounting and payment of any contributions
found to be due the trust funds.' 25
Noting the legislative history of section 8(f)12 the Supreme Court distin-
guished the present case from Higdon127 and concluded that the subcontractor
had enjoyed the benefits of section 8(f), had made an unrepudiated promise to
his employees, and thus "[h]aving had the music, he must pay the piper.' 128
In distinguishing this case from Higdon, the Court noted that:
There is a critical distinction between an employer's obligation under the Act
to bargain with the representative of the majority of its employees and its
duty to satisfy lawful contractual obligations that accrued after it enters a
prehire contract. Only the former obligation was treated in Higdon.
There is no sense in which respondents' contract action has a recognitional
propriate Union, or subordinate body signatory to this Agreement.
Id. n.l.
122. Article II, §§ D and E of the contract provided:
D. Employees employed by one or more of the Contractors for a period
of eight (8) days continuously or accumulatively under the work jurisdiction
of a particular Union as that term is defined herein shall be or become on the
eighth (8th) day or eight (8) days after the effective date of this Agreement,
whichever is later, members of such Union and shall remain members of such
Union as a condition of continued employment. Membership in such Union
shall be available upon terms and qualifications not more burdensome than
those applicable at such times to other applicants for membership to such
Union.
E. The Contractor shall discharge any employee pursuant to the forego-
ing section upon written notice from the Union of such employee's non-pay-
ment of initiation fees or dues.
McNeff, 461 U.S. at 263 n.2.
123. McNeff, 461 U.S. at 264 ("Each form was submitted by petitioner
[McNeft] with the false notation that 'no members of this craft were employed during
this month.' ").
124. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1982). See supra note 118.
125. McNeff, 461 U.S. at 264 (the pretrial audit found McNeff owed the trust
$5,316.79).
126. See infra notes 146-58 and accompanying text.
127. NLRB v. Local Union No. 103, Bridge Workers (Higdon), 434 U.S. 335
(1978). See supra notes 102-13 and accompanying text.
128. McNeff, 461 U.S. at 271 ("However limited the binding effect of a prehire
agreement may be, it strains both logic and equity to argue that a party to such an
agreement can reap its benefits and then avoid paying the bargained-for
consideration.").
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purpose like that forbidden in Higdon.
Neither does respondents' § 301 action trench on the voluntary and void-
able characteristics of a § 8(f) prehire agreement.12
In the most startling130 recent case, John Deklewa & Sons,131 the NLRB
made a 180 degree turn in its treatment of prehire agreements. The ultimate
impact of the decision is the prevention of unilateral repudiation of prehire
agreements by either party before their expiration.132
John Deklewa & Sons, a builder of commercial and industrial buildings,
executed a prehire agreement with the union'3 3 in 1960.13 In the agreement,
Deklewa agreed as a separate entity to adhere to the collective bargaining
agreement between the union and a multi-employer bargaining association."'
Deklewa remained a separate entity and entered successive agreements with
the union until it joined the multi-employer association in 1980. It subse-
quently executed the 1982-85 agreement that became the focus of the case.
Deklewa's commitment was short-lived. In 1983, it resigned from the multi-
employer association and "notified the Union that it was repudiating the con-
tract and withdrawing recognition." 38 The union objected to the repudiation
and filed a grievance which Deklewa maintained was not arbitrable because of
its repudiation of the agreement and withdrawal of recognition.13 7 The union
filed charges with the Board, alleging violations of sections 8(a)(5)138 and
8(a)(1)'" of the Act.'40
The Board considered the opinions of the parties and several interested
persons to determine "whether the Board should continue to adhere, in whole
or in part, to the current body of law interpreting and applying Section
8(f).'' 41 The Board noted several reasons for answering the question in the
129. Id. at 267, 269-70.
130. C. Murphy & P. Miscimarra, Pre-hire Agreements and the NLRB's
Deklewa Decision: A Supplemental Evaluation of Collective Bargaining Alternatives to
H.R. 281 1-2 (Mar. 5, 1987) (unpublished memorandum prepared for The Associated
General Contractors of America). "Deklewa can be fairly characterized as the single
most important development in construction industry labor law since the 1959 amend-
ments to the National Labor Relations Act . .. ." Id.
131. John Deklewa & Sons, 282 N.L.R.B. No. 184, 124 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1185
(Feb. 20, 1987), appealfiled, No. 87-3192 (3d Cir. Mar. 24, 1987).
132. Id. 124 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1194-95.
133. The International Association of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron
Workers, Local 3.
134. Deklewa, 282 N.L.R.B. No. 184, 124 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1186.
135. The Iron Workers Employer Association, of Western Pennsylvania, Inc. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1982). This section provides: "It shall be an unfair
labor practice for an employer to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives
of his employees, subject to the provisions of section 159(a) of this title." Id.
139. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1982). See supra note 113.
140. Deklewa, 282 N.L.R.B. No. 184, 124 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1187.
141. Id. Besides the General Counsel, those filing briefs included the Associated
[Vol. 53
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negative. Generally, the conversion doctrine, 14 2 as promulgated in R.J. Smith
Construction Co."" and Ruttmann Construction Co.,'" was believed to con-
tain several shortcomings that "permeate[d] the entire existing 8(f) analytic
scheme."' 4
5
The first problem with the section 8(f) law was that it did "not fully
square with either Section 8(f)'s legislative history or that section's actual
wording."" 641 The Board examined the legislative history and found that the
1959 amendments to the NLRA (which contained section 8(f)) were passed
because of congressional response to "serious problems" created by the NLRB
when it abandoned "its pre-1948 practice under the Wagner Act by asserting
jurisdiction over construction industry employers. 1" 7 The assertion of NLRB
jurisdiction interfered with established construction industry practices, includ-
ing the use of the prehire agreement, and sought to impose standards devel-
oped in an entirely different industrial context on this unique industry."" The
Builders and Contractors (ABC), the Council on Labor Law Equity, the National
Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation, the Building and Construction Trades De-
partment of the AFL-CIO, and the Teamsters. Id.
142. The conversion doctrine involved the concept that once a section 8(f) agree-
ment was entered, it could "convert" to section 9(a) status. Three stages existed. In the
preconversion stage, the agreement was unprotected. It did not confer a presumption of
majority status, could be repudiated by either party at any time, could not be enforced
in § 8(a)(5) or § 8(b)(3) proceedings, and did not raise an election bar. The employer
could challenge the union's status simply by repudiating the agreement and litigating it
when § 8(a)(5) charges were filed. In the conversion stage, the § 8(f) agreement
changed to a § 9(a) agreement. This could occur immediately upon the adoption of the
§ 8(f) agreement or at any time thereafter (prior to repudiation) without notice or the
awareness of either party. Several things have been held to constitute conversion, in-
cluding an actual attainment of majority support by the union, exclusive hiring hall
referrals, and enforcement of a union security clause. The conversion was not necessa-
rily tested at repudiation, but could have occurred at an earlier "relevant period" dur-
ing the agreement. The appropriate unit for the conversion was the employer's entire
workforce if they were "permanent and stable" or the workforce on a particular project
if they were "project by project." If the employer joined a multi-employer association,
the appropriate unit could have become the entire workforce of the association, depend-
ing on the result of a majority support inquiry. This was called the "merger doctrine."
In the post conversion stage, the employer could no longer repudiate the agreement or
withdraw union recognition; "an irrebuttable presumption of majority status" arose
and lasted until the agreement expired. Additionally, a rebuttable presumption arose
when the agreement expired that the union had majority support. The converted agree-
ment served as an election bar for its duration. Deklewa, 282 N.L.R.B. No. 184, 124
L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1188-89 (citations omitted).
143. 191 N.L.R.B. 693 (1971), enf. denied sub nom., Operating Engineers Local
150 v. NLRB, 480 F.2d 1186 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
144. 191 N.L.R.B. 701 (1971).
145. Deklewa, 282 N.L.R.B. No. 184, 124 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1189 n.16.
146. Id., 124 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1189.
147. Id., 124 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1189-90.
148. Id. Congress recognized two reasons for the use of prehire agreements: 1)
the necessity for a construction employer to know his labor costs before bidding on
projects and 2) the need for an available pool of labor, particularly because of the
1988]
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Board, after making this finding, asserted that the text of section 8(f), though
designed to deal with the particular characteristics of the construction indus-
try, had been considered only briefly.'4 In fact, the Board found that "this
law now often operates in a manner that contradicts the apparent congres-
sional intent.' 5 0 It found "a critical distortion of the significance of the second
proviso to Section 8(f) and its role in preserving employee free choice."' 1 1 Al-
though the proviso permits inquiry into the majority status of a union signa-
tory to a prehire agreement, the Board noted that:
There is . . . a significant distinction between permitting such an inquiry
through the Board's representational processes - the mechanism expressly
mentioned in the proviso - and permitting unilateral anticipatory repudia-
tion of an inquiry in unfair labor practice proceedings. Because such a right
of unilateral repudiation is so antithetical to traditional principles of collec-
tive-bargaining under the Act, it seems likely that Congress would have ex-
pressly stated such a right if it intended to create one.15'
Hence, the Board adopted the view that the second proviso to section 8(f) is
merely an "escape hatch" for employees to utilize through the decertification
process if they do not want representation from a union selected prior to their
employment. They may also select another representative through the election
process.5 3
The Board's second problem with section 8(f) law was that it did not
further the two overarching objectives of the NLRA. The Board felt that em-
sporadic employment patterns necessary in the industry. Congress also recognized the
difficulty of holding a representational election in the industry because of the seasonal
nature of the work and its short duration. Id., 124 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1190.
149. Id. The Board explained the decision in R.J. Smith Constr. Co., 191
N.L.R.B. 693 (1971), enf. denied sub nom., Operating Engineers Local 150 v. NLRB,
480 F.2d 1186 (D.C. Cir. 1973), as follows:
[T]he Board merely recited the aforementioned congressional language
recognizing the contemporary contractual practice in the construction indus-
try and the reasons for that practice. Then, after quoting Section 8(f) in full,
the Board summarily identified the second proviso as the lynchpin to inter-
preting the entire section and concluded that the proviso must have meant
that Congress intended to permit testing an 8(f) signatory union's majority
status during a contract term either by election or by litigation of refusal to
bargain charges.
Id. In reference to R.J. Smith and Ruttman Constr. Co., 191 N.L.R.B. 701 (1971), the
Board continued, "[I]t simply does not necessarily follow that because an 8(f) agree-
ment can only be entered into voluntarily either party to the agreement is unfettered in
its right 'voluntarily' to repudiate the agreement." Deklewa, 282 N.L.R.B. No. 184,
124 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1191.
150. Id., 124 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1191.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. The Board also abandoned the conversion doctrine, the workforce dis-
tinctions of "permanent and stable" and "project by project," and the merger doctrine
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ployee free choice and labor relations stability were not aided by existing
law."" Thus the Board decided that its own argument that the R.J. Smith
decision was based on employee free choice was "simply wrong."'5 5 In addi-
tion, the Board concluded that R.J. Smith and the conversion doctrine did not
further labor relations stability but instead fostered uncertainty and
disruption. 56
The third problem with section 8(f) law was a practical one. Because con-
version could occur at any "relevant" time during the course of the prehire
agreement, the outcome of subsequent litigation on the conversion issue hinged
on looking back upon the employment relationship. 57 The Board noted that
evidence gathered through this process, especially because of the sporadic na-
ture of the industry, was "often incomplete, contradictory, or unavailable.' ' 8
The Board rejected two alternatives to the conversion doctrine 59 as ex-
treme and inappropriate. 60 It then adopted four new basic principles that
"provide an overall framework for the interpretation and application of Sec-
tion 8(f) which will enable parties to 8(f) agreements and employees to know
their respective rights, privileges, and obligations at all stages in their relation-
ship."' 6' The four basic principles are:
1. A collective bargaining agreement permitted by Section 8(f) shall be
154. Id., 124 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1192.
155. Id. The Board found that both the employer ability to repudiate before con-
version and the union presumption of majority status after conversion impaired em-
ployee free choice.
156. Id. (unilateral repudiations cause disruption and do not emphasize stabil-
ity). The Board commented that under the conversion doctrine, "neither the parties to
the agreement nor the employees working under it can know with any degree of cer-
tainty what their respective rights and obligations are at any given time." Id., 124
L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1193.
157. Id.
158. Id. The Board also questioned whether the evidence gathered merited appli-
cation of 9(a) status.
159. The Board noted:
The first alternative would provide that an 8(f) representative can never
possess or acquire any majoritarian rights absent Board certification or volun-
tary recognition pursuant to Section 9(a). This view would retain the R.J.
Smith holding that an 8(f) agreement is unenforceable but would reject the
conversion doctrine by providing for the achievement of 9(a) status only
through traditional 9(a) processes.
The second alternative would provide that Section 8(f) represents an "al-
ternative means" for a construction industry employer and union to establish
the functional and legal equivalent of certification or 9(a) recognition subject
only to Section 8(f)'s second proviso that the agreement cannot act as a bar to
an election petition. The signatory union would enjoy immediate and complete
9(a) status (subject to the proviso) including a rebuttable presumption of ma-
jority status upon the contract's expiration.
Id.
160. Id., 124 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1193-94.
161. Id., 124 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1194.
19881 489
25
Lamy: Lamy: Recent Developments
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1988
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
enforceable through Sections 8(a)(5) and 8(b)(3).
2. Such agreement will not act as a contract bar to a representation
petition.
3. In processing such representation petitions the unit normally will be the
single employer's employees covered by the contract, rather than any multi-
employer unit.
4. Upon the expiration of that Section 8(f) agreement, the signatory
union will enjoy no presumption of majority status, and either party may repu-
diate the Section 8(f) bargaining relationship.'62
Finally, the Board determined that the above principles should be applied
retroactively, "'to all pending cases in whatever stage.' "1163 Although the
Board acknowledged the new principles are "a sharp departure from past pre-
cedent,"'" retroactive application was justified because the old rules were so
confusing. 6 5
The total impact of Deklewa remains to be seen. The NLRB has been
applying and expanding upon its principles.' 66 Additionally, the Third Circuit
affirmed Deklewa.16 7 Other circuit courts, however, have no obligation to fol-
162. Memorandum from Rosemary M. Collyer, General Counsel, to All Re-
gional Directors, Officers-In-Charge, and Resident Officers (Mar. 26, 1987) (guideline
memorandum concerning John Deklewa & Sons, 282 N.L.R.B. No. 184). See
Deklewa, 282 N.L.R.B. No. 184, 124 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1194-98. See also H. NOR-
THRUP, supra note 5, at 85-91.
163. Deklewa, 282 N.L.R.B. No. 184, 124 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1198 (quoting
Deluxe Metal Furniture Co., 121 N.L.R.B. 995, 1006-07 (1958)).
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. See, e.g., Viola Indus.-Elevator Div., Inc. and its alter ego Viola Indus.,
Inc., 286 N.L.R.B. No. 29 (1987); Kephart Plumbing, Inc. & Jack Kephart Plumbing,
285 N.L.R.B. No. 83 (1987); B.F.C. Corp., 285 N.L.R.B. No. 73 (1987); Precision
Striping, Inc., 284 N.L.R.B. No. 137 (1987) (the Board made this supplemental deci-
sion upholding its initial decision that the employer engaged in an unfair labor practice
under Deklewa principles, even though the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals denied en-
forcement of the initial decision); W.L. Miller Co. & Eastern Missouri Laborers' Dis-
trict Council, 284 N.L.R.B. No. 127 (1987); Jack Welsh Co., Inc. & United Brother-
hood of Carpenters & Joiners of America Local Union 690, 284 N.L.R.B. No. 43
(1987); Ken Hash Construction, Inc. & Dist. Council of Carpenters, 283 N.L.R.B. No.
132 (1987); System Electric Co., Inc. & International Brotherhood of Electric Work-
ers, 283 N.L.R.B. No. 99 (1987).
Since Deklewa, the Board has decided two cases which had been open questions
following the decision. In Yellowstone Plumbing, Inc., 286 N.L.R.B. No. 93 (1987),
the Board determined that whether the employer's withdrawal at the expiration of a
prehire agreement is tainted by bad faith is irrelevant under Deklewa principles. In
W.B. Skinner, Inc., 283 N.L.R.B. No. 149 (1987) the Board, applying the Deklewa
principle that a § 8(f) prehire agreement has § 9 status for its duration, held that a
construction employer unlawfully refused to allow an audit of its books at the union's
request to determine whether fringe benefit contributions were being made in compli-
ance with the agreement's terms.
167. International Ass'n of Bridge Workers, Local 3 v. NLRB, 843 F.2d 770 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 222 (1988).
. [Vol. 53
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low the Deklewa decision. In fact, even the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
declined to do so; although full panel review of the decision is pending to de-
termine if the circuit will follow Deklewa.'6 8 Additionally, a Seventh Circuit
court has refused retroactive application of Deklewa in a case before it, 6 9
despite the Board's expressed intent the principles be so applied.17 0 The Elev-
enth Circuit has also declined to abandon the doctrines surrounding prehire
agreements and their repudiation which Deklewa seeks to extinguish.' 7 ' Thus,
it is certain the courts have not seen the last of Deklewa.
IV. PROPOSED LEGISLATION
Recently, legislative attention has focused on the construction industry. 7 2
Construction interests have tried to amend the NLRA so as to gain more
favorable treatment of construction unions.'7 3
168. Mesa Verde Constr. Co. v. Northern California Dist. Council of Laborers,
820 F.2d 1006 (9th Cir.), opinion withdrawn, reh'g granted en banc, 832 F.2d 1164
(9th Cir. 1987). Cf. Northern District Council of Laborers v. Strauss Constr. Co., 672
F. Supp. 430 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (prehire agreement's repudiation by the employer was
allowed where there was actual notice to the union and not more than one employee in
the bargaining unit).
169. Construction Indus. Welfare Fund v. Jones, 672 F. Supp. 291 (N.D. Ill.
1987) (Employer who had repudiated a prehire agreement prior to the union's attain-
ment of majority status should not be audited or responsible for employee benefit fund
contributions which would have accrued from the date of repudiation to the expiration
of the prehire agreement. The court based its decision on the employer's reliance on
pre-existing law and its belief that Deklewa's policies would not be advanced by their
application to this case.).
170. Deklewa, 282 N.L.R.B. No. 184, 124 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1198.
171. Plumbers Local Union 72 v. John Payne Co., 850 F.2d 1535 (lth Cir.
1988) (outlining pre-Deklewa standards of judicial enforcement of § 8(f) agreements,
the Court held in effect, that Deklewa did not change the § 301 jurisdiction of the
federal district courts and remanded to the district court for decision on pre-Deklewa
grounds).
172. For discussion of the proposed legislation from the employer perspective, see
generally H. NORTHRUP, supra note 5, at 93-108. For summary and analysis of the
legislation, see V. Treacy, Construction Industry Labor Legislation: Summary and
Analysis of H.R. 281, 99th Congress (July 1, 1986) (available from U.S. Library of
Congress, Congressional Research Service); G. McCallion, Construction Industry Col-
lective Bargaining: Prehire Agreements and Double Breasting (updated Oct. 14, 1987)
(available from U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service). To trace
the progress of the legislation to date in the 100th Congress, see generally 45 Cong. Q.
Weekly (1987). The bill as it stands now will either live or die in the current (100th)
Congress by the end of 1988. It is scheduled to go to the full Senate "early" in 1988.
Given that is has passed the House in both of the last two Congresses, even if it dies in
1988, it will be interesting to see what happens to it in the 101st Congress with a new
administration.
173. During the 99th Congress, the House of Representatives passed H.R. 281,
the "Construction Industry Labor Law Amendments of 1986." H.R. 281, 99th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1986). However, the bill received strong opposition in the Senate and it never
came to a vote. H. NORTHRUP, supra note 5, at 94. An identical bill was reintroduced
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The legislation seeks to change the NLRA and its interpretation in three
in the 100th Congress. The text of the bill is set out infra. This bill was passed by the
House on June 17, 1987, but only by a 30-vote margin. 45 CONG. Q. WEEKLY 1333
(1987). This was 26 votes less than H.R. 281 garnered in the 99th Congress. Id. The
legislation has subsequently gone to the Senate. It was approved by the Senate Labor
and Human Resources Committee on December 9, 1987 and is to be reported to the
full Senate. 45 CONG. Q. WEEKLY 3046 (1987). No action has yet been taken by the
full Senate, although the bill was to be taken up in early 1988. Id. Also introduced in
the 100th Congress was an amended version of H.R. 281 in response to "legitimate
concern about ambiguities in the original bill." H. NORTHRUP, supra note 5, at 103
(quoting statement of Rep. Clay, Mar. 31, 1987). See id. at app. C for the text of the
suggested amendment. It clarifies some of the language in H.R. 281. However, it is
substantively the same and has not been adopted.
H.R. 281, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); S. 492, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. (1987)
provides:
A BILL
To amend the National Labor Relations Act to increase the stability of col-
lective bargaining in the building and construction industry.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of America in Congress assembled, That this Act may be referred to
as the "Construction Industry Labor Law Amendments of 1985".
SEC. 2. (a) Section 2(2) of the National Labor Relations Act (29 U.S.C.
152(2)) is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new sentence:
"In the construction industry, any two or more business entities performing or
otherwise conducting or supervising the same or similar work, in the same or
in different geographical areas, and having, directly or indirectly-
"(a) substantial common ownership;
"(b) common management; or
"(c) common control;
shall b- deemed a single employer.".
(b) Section 8(d) of such Act (29 U.S.C. 158(d)) is amended by adding
at the end thereof the following new sentence: "Whenever the collective bar-
gaining involves employees of a business entity comprising part of a single
employer in the construction industry, as defined in section 2(2) of this Act,
the duty to bargain collectively, for the purposes of this section, shall include
the duty to apply the terms of a collective bargaining agreement between such
business entity and a labor organization to all other business entities compris-
ing the single employer within the geographical area covered by the
agreement.".
(c) Section 8(f) of such Act (29 U.S.C. 158(f)) is amended-
(1) by striking out "geographical area:" in clause (4) and inserting in
lieu thereof the following: "geographic area. An agreement lawfully made
pursuant to this subsection shall impose the same obligations under this Act
as an agreement made with a majority representative pursuant to section
9(a):"; and
(2) by inserting before the period at the end of such section and the
following new proviso: ": Provided further, That any agreement lawfully
made pursuant to this subsection may be repudiated only after the Board cer-
tifies the results of an election conducted pursuant to section 9(c), in which a
majority of employees in an appropriate bargaining unit selects a bargaining
representative other than the labor organization with which such agreement
was made or chooses not to be represented by a labor organization".
SEC. 3. (a) Except as provided in subsection (b), the amendments made
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major respects. First, it would amend the definition of "employer" under the
NLRA.' 7' This change would virtually wipe out doublebreasting, whether le-
gitimate or sham. It would do so by making the factors traditionally weighed
by the Board to determine whether an employer was legitimately
doublebreasted (i.e. the interrelation of operations, common management, cen-
tralized control of labor relations, common ownership) 17 5 applicable in the dis-
junctive. Any one of the factors would make a construction employer the em-
ployer for any number of his operations under the NLRA.
The significance of this change becomes apparent once the second pro-
posed amendment is examined. It would amend section 8(d) of the Act 17 6 to
make the employer's bargaining obligation extend to all entities found to be
within "single employer" status under the above definition.1'" While the origi-
nal proposal did not clearly limit the geographic impact of the clause, substi-
tute proposals have.178 This would automatically extend an agreement negoti-
ated for one group of employees to other groups of employees, without regard
to the needs of subsequent groups or their working conditions." 9
The third major effect of the proposed NLRA amendments would be to
give prehire agreements the same effect as a collective bargaining agreement
negotiated after a section 9 election. This result was expressly rejected by the
by section 2 shall take effect upon the date of the enactment of this Act.
(b) The requirement imposed by the amendment made by section 2(b)
shall take effect-
(1) one year after such date of enactment with respect to any building
and construction project for which the contract was entered into by an em-
ployer before the date of the enactment of this Act; and
(2) on the date on which the contract is entered into with respect to any
new building or construction project for which the contract is entered into by
an employer on or after the date of the enactment of this Act.
174. Compare infra note 175 with 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1982) ("The term 'em-
ployer' includes any person acting as an agent of an employer, directly or indirectly,
but shall not include the United States or any wholly owned Government corporation,
or any Federal Reserve Bank, or any State or political subdivision thereof, or any per-
son subject to the Railway Labor Act, as amended from time to time, or any labor
organization (other than when acting as an employer), or anyone acting in the capacity
of officer or agent of such labor organization.").
175. See supra note 21.
176. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982) provides in pertinent part:
(d) For the purposes of this section, to bargain collectively is the per-
formance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of
the employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with re-
spect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the
negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the exe-
cution of a written contract incorporating any agreement reached if requested
by either party, but such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a
proposal or require the making of a concession ....
Id.
177. See supra note 175.
178. Id.
179. See H. NORTHRUP, supra note 5, at 98-100.
1988]
29
Lamy: Lamy: Recent Developments
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1988
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
NLRB in John Deklewa & Sons.1 8 0
Supporters of the legislation argue it is necessary to prevent construction
employers from using the doctrine of doublebreasting to funnel work from
union shops to nonunion shops, and to ensure prehire agreements have protec-
tion upon their expiration."" Opponents of the legislation argue it unreasona-
bly broadens single employer status, and may thus permit common-situs pick-
eting. They also argue it imposes unionization by sacrificing employee free
choice, and extinguishes a doctrine (doublebreasting) that is effectively strik-
ing a balance between the unions' right to seek to represent and the employers'
right to diversify. 82
V. CONCLUSION
The Board, the courts, and the legislature have recently focused their at-
tention on this area of labor law where exceptions swallow rules. Thus, in deal-
ing with the issues presented, caution and careful balancing should be exer-
cised in determining the appropriate changes. As Justice Holmes put it, in
describing the overarching principles of labor relations:
[O]ne of the eternal conflicts out of which life is made up is that between the
effort of every man to get the most he can for his services, and that of society,
disguised under the name of capital, to get his services for the least possible
return. Combination on the one side is patent and powerful. Combination on
the other is the necessary and desireable counterpart, if the battle is to be
carried on in a fair and equal way.' 83
This "battle" is particularly poignant in the construction industry today.
Recent trends away from unionization,' 8' accomplished largely by the use of
doublebreasting and the (questionably extinct) opportunity to repudiate
prehire agreements, have awakened construction interests to push for more
favorable legal treatment. Decisions such as that in Deklewa, forcing construc-
tion employers to honor prehire agreements for their duration, strike a logical
180. Compare supra note 175 with supra note 159 and accompanying text.
181. See, e.g., Construction Industry Labor Legislation, 1985: Hearings on H.R.
281 Before the Subcomm. on Labor-Management Relations of the House Comm. on
Education and Labor, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. - (1985) (statement of Robert A.
Georgine, President, Building and Construction Trades Department, AFL-CIO); G.
McCallion, Construction Industry Collective Bargaining: Prehire Agreements and
Double Breasting (updated Oct. 14, 1987) (available from U.S. Library of Congress,
Congressional Research Service).
182. See, e.g., G. McCallion, Construction Industry Collective Bargaining:
Prehire Agreements and Double Breasting (updated Oct. 14, 1987) (available from
U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service); H. NORTHRUP, supra note
5, at 93-108; National Coalition to Defeat H.R. 281/S. 492, Initial Analysis of Substi-
tute Amendment Offered by Rep. Clay (Mar. 31, 1987) (unpublished manuscript).
183. Modjeska, Recognition Picketing Under the NLRA, 35 U. FLA. L. REv.
633, 633 (1983) (citing Vegalahan v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 108, 44 N.E. 1077, 1081(1896) (Holmes, J., dissenting)). This article is an excellent overview of recognitional
picketing as a part of "the battle."
184. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
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balance between the interests of all concerned. After all, both sides voluntarily
entered the prehire agreement and fairness dictates it should have some pro-
tection. However, an important aspect of the Deklewa decision is the escape
hatch for employees; the opportunity to decertify. Equally important is the
"escape" for employers available at the expiration of the prehire. 185 A volunta-
rily entered prehire agreement is simply not a section 9 contract. The effect of
the proposed legislation would be to remove this distinction. The legislation
would also effectively wipe out doublebreasting, a doctrine developed to pro-
tect both the free choice of American workers and the economic liberty of
employers. Both legislative effects would skew the "eternal conflict" heavily in
favor of construction unions - when they already enjoy exceptions to other-
wise applicable rules.
LYNNE C. LAMY
185. The balance established by this escape may be chiseled away by a so-called
"bargaining dispute" exception to Deklewa wherein if an employer and union are rene-
gotiating a § 8(f) agreement the union may be permitted to use economic pressure
otherwise permitted by the Act. Quarterly Report of the General Counsel, [4 Labor
Relations] Lab. L. Rep. (CCH) T 9351 at 19,227 (Apr. 29, 1988); Address by Charles
E. Murphy, Esq., District of Columbia Bar - Labor Relations Section (May 20, 1988).
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